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STATE OF CONrECTICUT V. FRAN K McGuIRE, 84 CONN. 80 ATL. R.
In this case the Court in its opinion, written by Thayer, J.,
has rendered a valuable service to the profession by clearing away
the obscurity that is found in text books and in practice as to the
meaning of the term malice aforethought in the definitions of
murder and manslaughter. The usual definition of murder is:
that murder is the unlawful killing of one person by another
with malice aforethought; and the definition of manslal;ghter is,
that manslaughter is the unlawful killing of one person by another
without malice aforethought. Given a homicide not excused or
justified by law the question whether it is murder or man-
slaughter, is determined, by the definition, by the presence or
absence of malice aforethought. On the face of this situation it
would seem to the uninitiated student and practitioner, that the
distinction between the two crimes was to be sought in the state
of mind of the person who had unlawfully slain another.
Upon this rock text-book writers and practitioners have gone
to wreck. Without rehearsing the opinion, and its brief historical
survey which should be examined by all practitioners and stu-
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dents, the following conclusions are either directly expressed in
the opinion or logically deduced from it.
i. Malice aforethought in the definition of murder and man-
slaughter does not relate merely to the state of mind of the per-
son who unlawfully kills another.
2. Malice aforethought relates to the moral aspects of the act
causing death, as indicated by all the conditions and circum-
stances attending it, including the state of mind of the assailant.
3. The law defines the circumstances under which the killing
of one person by another is justified or excused.
4. If the killing of one person by another is not excused or
justified in law, and is therefore unlawful, the law defines the
circumstances attending the unlawful act causing death, which
will mitigate the act and reduce the crime to manslaughter.
5. The determination of what circumstances and conditions
attending an act causing the unlawful death of another mitigates
the killing and reduces the crime to manslaughter is not a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, but a question of law for the Court.
6. The only question for the jury is as to the existence or
non-existence of such facts as the Court informs them would so
mitigate an unlawful killing as to reduce the crime to man-
slaughter.
7. Malice aforethought has therefore now become merely a
technical term denoting that the circumstances attending an act
unlawfully causing the death of another are not such as the law
defines as sufficient to extenuate the act and reduce the crime to
manslaughter.
S. A killing of one person by another in the absence of cir-
cumstances attending the act causing death sufficient in law to
justify or excuse the act, or to mitigate it so far as to reduce the
crime to manslaughter, is murder.
9. It is not the duty of the Court to attempt to define the
term malice aforethought to the jury.
IO. It is practically impossible to so define the term malice
aforethought as to bring it within the comprehension of the aver-
age juror.
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Ii. It is entirely impossible to define this term as a state of
mind.
12. The jury can be instructed that if they find that an unlaw-
ful homicide has been committed by the accused and that the
crime is murder, certain circumstances (defined by statute and
stated to them) attending the act of killing will make the crime
murder in the first degree, and that if such circumstances are not
found proven by the requisite evidence the crime is murder in the
second degree.
13. In a case of homicide, when there are not present within
theorange of the evidence any circumstances in law justifying,
excusing or extenuating the homicide and no claim is made that
any such circumstances are present, the trial judge ought to so
state'to the jury leaving the issue, if guilt is found, between mir-
der of the first and second degree.
To any person who has given the subject in question any con-
sideration, the ordinary treatment of malice aforethought express
and implied, in homicide cases, has necessarily seemed confusifig
to the jury, and irrational. This case leads the way to a rational
treatment of this subject in homicide cases.
ADVISORY OPINIONS
The purpose of the courts of this country is primarily to try
cases. Questions which come before them in moot form they
refuse to consider at all. Nevertheless in some jurisdictions the
courts of last resort are found advising the state legislature as
to the constitutionality of certain bills pending before that body.
The recent case of In re House Resolution No. io, 114 Pac., 293
(Colo.) calls attention to the fact that the exercise of this extra-
judicial function is peculiar to but a few states in this country.
Historically the exercise of this extra-judicial function by the
judges dates back to very early times in English jurisprudence.
But even in those early times the judges were rather reluctant in
giving their opinion in matters pending before Parliament and
they usually did so with the understanding that they could change
their minds if a case involving the same point were to come
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before them sitting as a court. It seems that when the advice of
the judges was sought by the King himself, they gave it rather
f rom their reverence, respect and subordination to the King than
from a sense of duty as judges.
In 146o when the Duke of York placed before Parliament his
claim against the title of Henry VI to the Crown, which was de-
livered to the Chancellor by way of petition to the House of
Lords, the Lords sent for the King's judges to have their advice
in the matter. They presented the petition and claim to the judges
and required them in the King's name to advise them therein and
to search and find arguments for the King against this claim.
The judges in answer said that they were the King's judges to
determine matters that were actually before them in law, between
party and party, and that in such matters between party and party
they would not be of counsel. Therefore they refused to answer
because the matter was between the King and the Duke of York
as parties. Also that it had not been the custom to call the King's
judges to counsel in such matters, and especially such a matter
which was so high in its nature and touched the King's estate,
and Royal Crown which is above the common law. Fortescue's
Reports, 384.
The Lords again sent for the judges to advise them on other
questions, and again the judges said that they dare not answer,
but the Lords would not allow it and they asked several questions
of the judges which they answered. In George Sackville's Case,
2 Eden, 372, decided in 176o, the King referred this question to
the judges: "Whether an officer of the army, having been dis-
missed from His Majesty's service, and having no military em-
ployment, is triable by a court martial for a military offence
lately committed by him while in actual service and pay as an
officer?" They answered the question in the affirmative, but they
expressly said that they should be ready to change their opinion,
if they should see cause, upon objections that might be laid before
them. According to Ophdioii of Justices, 126 Mass., 562, this is
the last case in which the judges were called on to give an opinion
by the Crown. However, Parliment continues even to this day
to ask such advisory opiniofs of the judges and tley are given.
Some years previous to this the judges were called into con-
sultation to aid in settling the question as to whether the soy-
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ereign had the right to dictate in regard to the education and
marriage of the Prince of Wales. 15 Howells State Tr., 1195.
In Peachman's Case, Vol. 4 of Bacon's Works, p. 595, a minister
was indicted for certain treasonable passages publislfed in a ser-
mon. When Lord Coke was called upon to give an advisory
opinion he was most reluctant to do so. A similar degree of cau-
tion was exhibited in a great case which occurred in the reign of
Queen Anne, in the year of 1711. Of the twelve judges sitting,
four thought it proper for the court to give an advisory opinion,
but the remaining eight thought that, though they would answer
the questions asked, they had the right to reserve the power to
change their opinion if due cause were shown. Barnett's Own
times, Vol. III, p. 325. The same caution was shown in Mac-
Naghten's Case, lO Cl. & F., 200, and also in Queen Caroline's
Case, 2 Br. & Bing., 284. In these cases it is stated that the
opinion of the judges as rendered in cases of this nature is of
no binding effect. It has no judicial significance, except in so
far as it is their own private opinion.
The origin of this extra-judicial function in this country is to
be found in the oldest constitution now extant, that of Massa-
chusetts, a document that was adopted as early as 178o. Chapter
III, Article 2, reads as follows: "Each branch of the legisla-
ture, as well as the governor and council, shall have authority to
require the opinions of the supreme judicial court, upon important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."
An attempt was made in the convention which framed the
Federal Constitution to incorporate into it a provision which was
a verbatim copy of that of the M,1assachusetts Constitution, but
it was unsuccessful. Madison's Journal of the Federal Conven-
tion (Scott's Edition, 1894), 558, 559. During Washington's
term as President he once asked the United States Supreme
Court to give construction to the treaty with France. They re-
fused absolutely. There has never been an instance since that
time in which that court has been called upon for an opinion of
this nature.
There are seven states in the Union at present with the con--
stitutional provisions requiring their courts to give advisory-
opinions: Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New ITamp-
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shire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. It is needless to say that
the provisions of the Maine and New Hampshire constitutions are
'identical with that of Massachusetts in requiring the courts to
:give opinions "upon important questions of law and upon solemn
,occasions." There was virtue in every law enacted by the Mother
Colony.
The constitution of Colorado, which governs the principal case,
has an amendment similar to the provision of the Massachusetts
constitution. Article V, Section 13, of the constitution of South
Dakota reads as follows: "The governor shall have authority to
require the opinions of the judges of the supreme court upon
important questions of law involved in the exercise of his execu-
tive powers and upon solemn occasions." This, of course, differs
from the others in that only the governor may ask for the opinion,
and then only upon questions which relate to the conduct of his
office or upon solemn occasions. Florida's constitution of 1887
follows this idea and limits the right tW an opinion to the gov-
ernor. The "Upon solemn occasions" phrase is also omitted
and the governor must confine his questions to those dealing with
"the interpretation of this constitution upon any question af-
iecting his executive powers and duties." The Rhode Island
constitution seems to give the broadest scope of any of the con-
stitutions. It reads as follows: "The judges of the Supreme
Court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law
whenever requested by either branch of the legislature or by the
governor."
In Vermont the matter is controlled by statute, and acting
-under this statute the supreme court of that State has answered
a question placed before it. Opinion of Judges, 37 Vt., 665. But
not so in Minnesota where a similar statute existed at one time.
fIn the case of Matter of Application of Senate, IO Minn., 78, the
statute was declared unconstitutional, because, said the court, it
is the duty of each department of government to abstain from
:and oppose encroachments on either of the others, and, further-
-more, the duty sought to be imposed is neither a judicial act, nor
is it sought to be performed in a judicial manner. An unauthor-
ized expression of opinion by a judge or court, especially one of
last resort, upon a matter which may subsequently come before
the court for adjudicatidn, is improper.
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The supreme court of Nebraska has answered questions with-
out the authority of a constitutional provision or even of a
statute. The auditor of public accounts asked for an opinion in
regard to the conduct of his office and got it. In re Babcock,
21 Neb., 500. In the case of In re School Fund, 15 Neb., 684,
the court advised the school board as to an investment of funds.
In re G. A. Brown, Reporter, 15 Neb., 688, is a case in which the
reporter of the decisions of the Supreme Court sought informa-
tion of the court as to the price he should pay for the binding of
the decisions in volumes. The desired information was given.
It is evident that this extra-judicial function is very limited in
its use both in this country and in England. There the King no
longer seeks advisory opinions of the courts and when it is con-
sidered that the court of last resort of that country is composed of
members of the House of Lords it is not strange that that body
should seek the opinions of the court. But even under these con-
ditions opinions are not asked very often. In this country the
courts give the opinions of this nature in but nine of the states
and seven of these are controlled by constitutional provision. It
is a duty that is ordinarily placed upon the attorney general's of-
fice. Even in the states where this function is exercised the courts
are most reluctant to give an opinion and avoid doing so as often
as possible. One of the greatest objections to placing this duty
upon the courts is that expressed by the Minnesota court when
it said that the theory of the independence of the three depart-
ments of government was destroyed when this extra burden was
placed upon the courts.
STATES-ACTION BY TAXPAYER-INJUNCTION-AUTHORITY.
In the absence of a statute, a taxpayer, according to Long v.
Johnson, 127 N. Y. Sup., 756, having no rights aside from those
possessed by taxpayers as a whole, may not sue to restrain a
State commission appointed by the governor to construct a prison
plant, though the commission has not been economical, has shown
favoritism, and also has made errors in judgment in adopting
plans and advertising for bids.
Courts of equity cannot by injunction control the exercise of
political, judicial or legislative functions by public officers, al-
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though the passage of a void ordinance may sometimes be en-
joined, nor will they thus control the exercise of discretion by
public officers and authorities, Jones v. No. Wilkesboro, 15o N.
C., 646, except to prevent a manifest abuse of discretion and to,
require that such discretion be exercised according to law. Cooke
v. Iverson, ioS linn., 388. But equity will not restrain acts of
authorized officers for mere irregularities or for mere mistakes in
judgment. Long v. Shepherd, .... Ala...... Nor can it be in-
voked to declare in advance that proposed or threatened acts will,
if performed, be illegal and void. Thilcer v. O'Dell, 134 App.
Div., 272. "The true test in all such cases is as to the nature
of the specific act in question, rather than as to the general func-
tions and duties of the officer. If the act which it is sought to
enjoin is executive instead of ministerial in its character, or if it
in'volves the exercise of judgment and discretion upon the part
of the officer, as distinguished from a merely ministerial duty, its
performance will not be prevented by injunction." 2 High or
Injunctions, Sec. 1326.
One of the most frequent occasions for the intervention of
equity is to protect taxpayers from an unreasonable increase of
their burdens by the waste or illegal disposition of public funds.
Flhedcer v. Union Point, 132 Ga., 568. And generally official acts
will not be enjoined until some injury to the complainant is at
least threatened and a taxpayer seeking the injunction must show
a personal interest which will be affected by the threatened act.
Lagoo v. Hill, 143 Ili. App., 523.
Where a state board, of which the governor was a member, was
acting under the authority of an unconstitutional law, any person
who sustained injury thereby and whose remedy at law was in-
complete or inadequate, could enjoin the board from such action.
Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S., 531. But the court
will not interfere by injunction to arrest the action of public
officers in the performance of a public duty unless it clearly ap-
pears that it is in violation of the constitution or without legal
warrant. The business affairs of a municipality are committed to
the corporate authorities and the courts will not interfere at the
suit of taxpayers, except in a clear case of mismanagement or
fraud, by restraining such public officers by injunction from mak-
ing contracts. McMaster v. Mayor, etc., of Waynesboro, i2
Ga., 231.
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Unless it is clearly shown that a state board of education has
transcended its powers in providing for a central depository for
text books, it will not be restrained at the suit of an injured in-
dividual taxpayer, where his interest is small and the plans of
the board have been carried almost to completion. Duncan v.
Hayward, 74 So. Car., 56o. Taxpayers of a municipal corpora-
tion are proper parties to invoke the preventive aid of equity in
restraint of illegal action on the part of the municipality or its
officers and it is held that a citizen and taxpayer has such an
interest in the subject matter as to entitle him to an injunction to
prevent the authorities of a municipal corporation from incurring
indebtedness in excess of the maximum fixed by the constitution
of the State as the limit beyond which municipal corporations'
indebtedness shall not be incurred. City of Springfield v. Ed-
wards, 84 Ill., 626.
An individual taxpayer cannot enjoin a state prison superin-
tendent from supplying his family out of state funds for prison
purposes, where the secretary of state receives the accounts of all
prison expenditures and audits them, and no money is expended
except on warrants issued by him. And even if a superintendeqt
of the penitentiary may be receiving the labor of prisoners for
his own profit and is liable for malfeasance in office, yet this is
no ground for equitable interference at the suit of a taxpayer.
Sears v. James, 47 Oreg., 5o. But where the fund has already
been wasted or paid out, the action to recover it back must be
brought by the state or municipality to which it belonged. Brown-
field v. Ha user, 30 Oregon, 534.
Actual and material injury, not fanciful or theoretical or merely
possible, must be shown as the necessary or probable result of the
action sought to be restrained. "The complainant who seeks an
injunction must be able to specify some particular act, the per-
formance of which will damnify him, and it is such an act alone
that he can restrain. This court has no power to examine an act
of the legislature generally and declare it unconstitutional. A
suitor who calls upon a court of chancery to arrest the perfor-
mance of a duty imposed by the legislature upon a public officer,
must show conclusively not only that the act about to be per-
formed is unconstitutional, but also that it will inflict a direct
injury upon him." Gibbs v. Green, 54 Miss., 592.
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Equity will not entertain a suit for injunction where there is a
full and complete remedy at law. Where a remedy for any partic-
ular wrong or injury has been provided by statute, the general
rule is that no relief in equity can be afforded in such a case by
injunction. Weber v. Timlin, 37 Minn., 274. It seems that this
general doctrine is applicable, although the provisions of the
statute may conflict with the notions of natural justice entertained
by a court of equity. Glenn v. Fowler, 8 Gill. & J., 340. The
rule is subject to a few exceptions. It has been held that the
fact that a statutory method of procedure exists does not take
away the right of a court of equity to interfere by injunction for
the prevention of a multiplicity of suits where the circumstances
render such interposition proper. Bishop v. Rosenbaum, 58
Miss., 84. Under the English Judicature Act of 1873, Sec. 25,
Subsection 8, which enables the court to grant an injunction in all
cases in which it appears just and convenient to the court, it would
seem that the existence of a statutory remedy would be no
obstacle in the way of granting an injunction. Cooper v. Whit-
tihgham, 15 Chan. Div., 501.
The adequacy or inadequacy of a remedy at law for the pro-
tection of the rights of one entitled upon any ground to invoke
the powers of a Federal Court, is not to be conclusively deter-
mined by the statutes of the particular state in which suit may
be brought. One who is entitled to sue in the Federal Circuit
Court may invoke its jurisdiction in equity whenever the estab-
lished principles and rules of equity permit such a suit in that
court; and he cannot be deprived of that right by reason of his
being allowed to sue at law in a state court on the same cause of
action. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., 466.
In the case at hand, since the taxpayer had no special grievance
arising from the acts of the state commission, beyond what all
other taxpayers had, and since he sustained no actual injury, he
cannot proceed in equity to restrain the actions of the commis-
sion, and for a public wrong redress must be sought only through
the state or its officcers and not by an individual.
TIlE RULE THAT CROSS BILLS AND ORIGINAL BILLS MUST BE GERMANE
AS APPLIED TO INJUNCTIONS.
Equity is never content to do justice in halves, but rather seeks
to right the wrongs of all parties whenever those wrongs relate to
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the subject matter of a bill filed in its courts. It is as solicitous
for a defendant as for a complainant. It is but natural that a
complainant urge the redress of his own wrongs and be unmind-
ful of the sufferings of the defendant. Circumstances are often
such that he may consistently do this even with due regard for
the maxim: He who seeks equity must do equity. A practical
method by which one who has been made a defendant in a suit
in equity, may obtain affirmative relief is that of filing a cross
bill. A cross bill must seek discovery or relief, and is not to be
used as a means of producing defensive matter which would be
equally available by way of answer to the original bill. Its sub-
ject matter must be germane to the original bill, that is, it must
confine itself to the same matter as the original bill, and it cannot
introduce a new controversy not embraced in the original bill.
Such bills are introduced in injunction proceedings as well as in
other suits in equity, as is evident from an examination of the
recent case of Root v. Root, 130 N. AV., 194 (Mich.).
The parties to this cause were husband and wife. They were
engaged in the business of selling musical instruments. A dispute
as to the management of the business caused the wife to leave
her husband, and start a business similar in character in the same
city. Thereupon the husband filed a bill in which he averred his
ability *and willingness to support his wife, and prayed that she
be enjoined from continuing against his will to prosecute the com-
petitive business established by her. Along with her answer the
defendant filed a cross bill in which shd charged the complainant
with extreme cruelty and prayed for a divorce. The question
then arose, was such a cross bill germane to the original bill? In
what manner did the prayer for divorce relate to a bill seeking
to enjoin a wife from engaging in a business similar to that
conducted by her husband? The trial court regarded the cross
bill as proper, dismissed the original bill, and granted the divorce.
On appeal the Supreme Court sustained the lower court as far as
the propriety of the cross bill was concerned. To reach the con-
clusion that the cross bill was proper it was necessary to show that
the subject matter of the cross bill was germane to that of the
original bill. The court reasoned that the relation of husband
and wife was the real basis of the husband's right to enjoin the
wife from engaging in the same business. Therefore a divorce
was the means of destroying that relation, and once that relation
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was severed the husband's right to an injunction was lost. How-
ever, the purpose of the cross bill failed, inasmuch as the higher
court set aside the decree granting the divorce, on the ground
that the cruelty averred was'not sufficiently proved. The injunc-
tion sought by the husband was granted. One dissenting member
of the court declared that the cross bill should never have been
considered in such a proceeding, but he, of course, concurred in
the result.
In Mathiason v. St. Louis, 156 Mo., 196, the complainant
sought by injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering
with a drain pipe which the complainant had constructed, and
Which led from his fertilizer factory under a public highway to a
private sewer. The defendant filed a cross bill in which it sought
to have the factory declared a public nuisance. The court held
that such a bill was not germiane to the original bill, the subject
matter of which was the drain pipe leading from the factory.
Another case Concerning a drain was that of Wetmore v. Fiske,
15 R. 1., 354, where the court held that, in an action brought to
restrain the defendant from stopping the flow of water in a
drain, the defendant might properly set up by way of cross bill,
that the complainant was wrongfully disposing of the sewage
through the drain and pray that he might be restrained from so
doing, as the cross bill pertained only to the subject matter of the
original bill, namely, the use of the drain.
Where there are two mills situated on the banks of the same
stream, one below the odther, and the owner of the upper mill
brought suit to restrain the owner of the lower mill from so in-
creasing the height of his dam that the water would flow back in
the mill race of the upper mill and injure the machinery there,
it was held that the defendant might file a cross bill in which he
alleged that he had been injured because the complainant had
diverted waters of the stream, to the use of which the defendant
was entitled, because such a bill related to the rights of the re-
spective parties in the use of the stream which furnished the
power for each privilege, which was the subject matter of the
original bill. This ruling is to be found in the case of Atlanta
Mills v. Mason, 12o Mass., 244. But a somewhat similar situa-
tion existed in Brownlee v. Warmack, 90 Ga., 775. The complain-
ant had secured by deed the right to obtain water to operate his
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mill from a spring which was situated on the land of the de-
fendant. The latter threatened to dig ditches about the spring
and thus cut off the water supply to the defendant. The mill
owner filed a bill asking that the defendant be restrained from
the performance of his threat. With the answer came a cross
bill asking for a decree awarding the defendant damages for an
injury suffered by him because of the tortious act of the com-
plainant in failing to repair his mill race, and allowing breaches
in the banks thereof, whereby water escaped unto the defend-
ant's land. The matter complained of in the cross bill was a tort,
and the court held that it was not germane to any mater in the
original petition.
One Doremus, in Doremus v. Pattersonl. 70 N. J. Eq., 296, insti-
tuted proceedings to restrain the city of Patterson from polluting
a certain river which flowed past his property. The city intro-
duced a cross bill, admitting the nuisance complained of, but
averred that a certain water company had diverted, unlawfully,
for the use of another city, certain water which would have
flowed past the defendant city and helped to dilute the water.
This cross bill was held to be improper, since it was not ger-
mane, for, said the court, it tended to involve the complainant in
a new controversy, that is, whether the water company had the
right to divert the water.
According to Stansel v. Hahn, 50 South., 696, where a trustee
of an estate sued to enjoin the sale of a beneficiary's interest in a
trust, the sale being under execution, a cross bill which alleged
that the income due the beneficiary from the estate was sufficient
to support him and pay all his bills was not germane to the ori-ginal petition. In Peters v. Case, 57 S. ., 733, state Peters owned
a tract of land, between which and the public highway was another
traft owned by Case, who also owned land on the other side of
Peters' property. A private road ran through Case's land on the
farther side of Peters' tract, through that belonging to Peters,
then through Case's second portion of land, and thus unto the
main highway. Peters had some time before erected a building
on that part of the private road which ran through his property.
Case retaliated by erecting a structure on the section of road run-
ning through his land to the public highway. It was this act of
Case's which Peters sought to enjoin by an injunction. Case
YALE LAW JOURNAL
then filed a cross bill complaining of Peters' action in erecting a
building on the roadway also. To support his cross bill Case
relied on the maxims: He who comes into equity must do so with
clean hands, and, He who seeks equity must do equity. Thow-
ever, the court refused to regard the cross bill as germane to the
original bill, nor would it apply the maxims because the defendant
sought the application for an alleged wrong, which was wholly
foreign to the particular wrong complained of in the petition.
From these analogous cases it would appear that the judgment
rendered in the principal case was really an extension of the rule.
The reasoning is nice, in the true sense of that word, but it bears
the scars of a struggle on the part of the court to make the two
bills germane. As the rule is generally understood, it is the
subject matter of the two bills that must be germane. The cross
bill concerned itself with the cruelty of the husband. The original
bill with the competitive business of the wife. It is difficult to
conceive how the one is akin to the other. The affirmative relief
asked for by the wife was freedom from the husband's cruelty,
and a divorce was the means of accomplishing this. True, the
court has argued that if the divorce were granted, then the hus-
band's right to the injunction would fail, and it is this connection
that satifies the demand for the relevancy of the two bills. Is
this not an extension of the rule? The connection as viewed by
the court operates to deny the relief sought by the complainant,
and by this indirection to relieve the defendant. In .M1athiason v.
St. Louis, cited above, the court, reasoning in the same manner,
might have declared the factory a nuisance and the use of the
drain would have necessarily been discontinued. Therefore, by
the extension of the rule as laid down by the Michigan court, an
original bill and a cross bill will be considered germane whenever
the means of relief asked for in the cross bill is destructive of
the right to seek the relief asked for in the original petition.
COMMERCE-INTERSTATE CO M MERCE-REGULATION-CONSTIT'U-
TIONALITY OF "'WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT."
The act of June 25, 1910, c. 395, 36 Stat., 825, known as the
"White Slave Traffic Act," making it a criminal offence to know-
ingly transport or to procure the transportation of women from
94
COMMENTS
one state into another for immoral purposes, is not unconstitu-
tional as an attempted infringement of the police powers belong-
ing to the states, and is within the powers conferred on Congress
by the commerce clause of the Constitution. The case of United
States v. Westinan, 182 Fed., 1017, so held.
The constitutionality of this act is sought to be challenged on
the ground that it is an unwarrantable attempt on the part of
Congress to exercise police powers, which powers, generally
speaking, belong to the states. The keeping, harboring and main-
tenance of a woman wholly within the confines of a single state
for purposes of prostitution was held to be a matter for the
police regulations of the state and not of the United States.
Keller v. U. S., 213 U. S., 138. But in the case under discussion
the basis of the suit is the act of transportation, or causing to be
transported, or aiding or assisting in the transportation by the pur-
chase or supplying with tickets therefor, from one state into
another; the said transportation being for some unlawful purpose
denounced by the law.
The meaning of the word "commerce" has from time to time
been interpreted to include sales of goods and commodities and
intercourse necessary to accomplish the first. Swift v. United
States, 196 U. S., 375, says, "Commerce is the sale or exchange of
commodities, but that which the law looks upon as the body of
commerce is not restricted to specific acts of sale or exchange. It
includes the intercourse, all the initiatory and intervening acts,
instrumentalities and dealings that directly bring about the sale or
exchange."
It was said in the Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283, "Commerce is
defined to be an 'exchange of commodities.' But this definition
does not convey the full meaning of the term. It includes naviga-
tion and intercourse. That the transportation of passengers is
part of commerce is not now an open question." And to the
same effect is Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156
Fed., i, saying, "Importation from one state into another is the
indispensable element of interstate commerce and every negotia-
tion, contract, trade and dealing which contemplates and causes
such importation, whether it be of goods, persons or information,
is a transaction of interstate commerce."
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Accordingly, acts requiring carriers to provide separate coaches
for the transportation of white and colored passengers, and mak-
ing it an offense for a passenger to refuse to occupy the car to
which he is assigned by the conductor, are held valid in so far as
they affect commerce wholly within the state, but invalid as to
interstate passengers under the co1fimerce clause of the federal
constitution. Hart v. State, ioo Mv'd., 595. And so the court
said, "The thousands of people who daily pass and repass over the
bridge from the Kentucky to the Ohio shore may be as truly
said to be engaged in commerce as if they were shipping cargoes
of merchandise from New York to Liverpool." Covington Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S., :204.
The view taken of the meaning of commerce by the United
States courts clearly allows the United States to legislate against
the white slave traffic in the manner in which the "White Slave
Traffic Act" provides.
